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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Under Section 2333 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, as
amended by the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism
Act, U.S. nationals injured by “an act of international
terrorism” that is “committed, planned, or authorized
by” a designated foreign terrorist organization may sue
any person who “aids and abets, by knowingly providing substantial assistance, or who conspires with the
person who committed such an act of international terrorism,” and recover treble damages.
18 U.S.C.
§ 2333(a), (d)(2). The questions presented are:
1. Whether a defendant that provides generic,
widely available services to all its numerous users and
“regularly” works to detect and prevent terrorists from
using those services “knowingly” provided substantial
assistance under Section 2333 merely because it allegedly could have taken more “meaningful” or “aggressive” action to prevent such use.
2. Whether a defendant whose generic, widely
available services were not used in connection with the
specific “act of international terrorism” that injured the
plaintiff may be liable for aiding and abetting under
Section 2333.

(i)

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
Petitioner is Twitter, Inc., which was a defendant
in the district court and an appellee in the court of appeals. Google LLC and Facebook, Inc. (now known as
Meta Platforms, Inc.) were also defendants in the district court and appellees in the court of appeals.
Respondents are Mehier Taamneh, Lawrence
Taamneh, Sara Taamneh, and Dimana Taamneh. They
were plaintiffs in the district court and appellants in the
court of appeals.

(ii)

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Twitter, Inc. has no parent company, and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.

(iii)

DIRECTLY RELATED PROCEEDINGS
Taamneh, et al. v. Twitter, Inc., et al., No. 18-17192
(9th Cir.) (opinion and judgment issued on June 22,
2021; rehearing denied on December 27, 2021).
Taamneh, et al. v. Twitter, Inc., et al., No. 3:17-cv04107-EMC (N.D. Cal.) (order granting motion to dismiss and judgment issued on October 29, 2018).

(iv)
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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States
No. 21TWITTER, INC.,
Petitioner,
v.
MEHIER TAAMNEH; LAWRENCE TAAMNEH;
SARA TAAMNEH; DIMANA TAAMNEH,
Respondents.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CONDITIONAL PETITION
FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Twitter, Inc. respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in this case in
the event that the Court grants the petition for certiorari currently pending in Gonzalez v. Google LLC, No.
21-1333 (U.S. Apr. 4, 2022).
INTRODUCTION
This is a protective, conditional petition relating to
Gonzalez. The Court should deny review in that case,
but if the Court grants review there, it should grant in
this case as well. At a minimum, if the Court grants
review in Gonzalez, it should hold this case pending its
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disposition of two ATA cases currently before the
Court at the certiorari stage, Weiss v. National Westminster Bank, PLC, No. 21-381 (U.S. Sept. 3, 2021) and
Strauss v. Crédit Lyonnais, S.A., No. 21-382 (U.S.
Sept. 3, 2021).
Both Gonzalez and this case come to the Court in
an unusual procedural posture. The Ninth Circuit decided both cases in a single opinion. But although both
cases involved materially identical allegations and arguments on appeal, the Ninth Circuit reached different
results in the two cases. In Gonzalez, the court held
that the plaintiffs’ claims were generally barred under
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 47
U.S.C. § 230, and that the remaining allegations failed
to state a claim for either direct or secondary liability
under the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA), 18 U.S.C.
§ 2333(a), (d)(2). But in this case, the same panel declined to consider Section 230 at all and instead held
that Twitter, Google, and Facebook (“Defendants”)
could be liable for aiding and abetting an act of international terrorism because they provided generic, widely
available services to billions of users who allegedly included some supporters of ISIS. The court so held even
though Defendants have policies prohibiting use by terrorist organizations, they regularly enforce those policies by removing content posted by supporters of such
organizations, and their services were not used in connection with the relevant act of international terrorism.
The Court should deny certiorari in Gonzalez. If it
does, that decision will also resolve this case. Because
the two cases are materially indistinguishable, the parties here have stipulated to dismissal of this action if
this Court denies the Gonzalez certiorari petition. See
Stipulation and Order 3, Dist. Ct. Dkt. 88. But in the
event the Court grants certiorari in Gonzalez, it should
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also grant in this case. To the extent the claim in this
case can proceed notwithstanding Section 230, the
Ninth Circuit’s misguided interpretation and application of the ATA’s aiding-and-abetting provision warrants review.
As amended by the Justice Against Sponsors of
Terrorism Act (JASTA), Pub. L. No. 114-222, 130 Stat.
852 (2016), the ATA allows any U.S. national injured by
reason of “an act of international terrorism” to sue “any
person who aids and abets, by knowingly providing
substantial assistance, or who conspires with the person who committed such an act of international terrorism.” 18 U.S.C. § 2333(d)(2). A successful plaintiff is
entitled to treble damages and the cost of the suit, including attorney’s fees. Id. § 2333(a).
This case is the sole outlier among more than a dozen lawsuits seeking to hold social media companies liable under the ATA for the consequences of terrorist
attacks committed around the world. The remaining
cases all were dismissed, including in cases affirmed by
the Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits. Departing from all of these, the Ninth Circuit held that
respondents (“Plaintiffs”) plausibly alleged the scienter
demanded by Section 2333(d)(2)—i.e., that Defendants
“knowingly” assisted the principal wrong—even though
Defendants had policies prohibiting supporters of terrorism from using their platforms and regularly enforced those policies by terminating accounts and removing terrorist content. According to the Ninth Circuit, Defendants nonetheless possessed the requisite
scienter because third parties had reported that some
ISIS supporters were somewhere among the billions of
individuals who used Defendants’ platforms and Defendants’ efforts to remove terrorist content allegedly
could have been more “meaningful” and “aggressive.”
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App. 62a. The court further held that it did not matter
that Defendants’ widely available services were not
used in connection with the specific terrorist act in
question. According to the court, it was enough for
Plaintiffs to have alleged that Defendants aided, in
some general sense, “ISIS’s terrorism campaign” or
“enterprise.” App. 52a-54a, 63a. Both holdings conflict
with the ATA’s text and structure, as well as
longstanding principles of aiding-and-abetting law, and
threaten liability for ordinary businesses providing
widely available services, such as telephone companies
providing run-of-the-mill telecommunications services.
Each error warrants review, but the two combined
are particularly troubling. No other circuit has construed secondary liability under the ATA to sweep so
broadly. In two ATA cases currently before the Court
at the certiorari stage, the Second Circuit held that assisting an organization that allegedly had ties to terrorism without knowing that the aid would be used for a
“terroristic purpose” does not support aiding-andabetting liability under Section 2333. Weiss v. National Westminster Bank, PLC, 993 F.3d 144, 166-167 (2d
Cir. 2021), cert. filed, No. 21-381 (U.S. Sept. 3, 2021); see
also Strauss v. Crédit Lyonnais, S.A., 842 F. App’x 701
(2d Cir. 2021) (mem.) (disposing of the case “for the
reasons discussed in Weiss”), cert. filed, No. 21-382
(U.S. Sept. 3, 2021). Here, by contrast, the Ninth Circuit applied no “terroristic purpose” requirement. To
the contrary, it acknowledged that Plaintiffs do not allege that Defendants had “any intent to further or aid
ISIS’s terrorist activities” or “shared any of ISIS’s objectives,” and that, even according to Plaintiffs, Defendants “regularly” enforced rules against terrorist
content. App. 65a. Plaintiffs’ allegations do not satisfy
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the knowledge standard applied by the Second Circuit
in Weiss and Strauss.
This Court’s review is especially important given
the broad impact of the questions presented. Civil lawsuits under the ATA are common. And as the United
States explained (before JASTA’s enactment) in emphasizing the importance of a proximate cause requirement, civil ATA liability should not reach “individuals and entities whose activities have only an attenuated relationship to the plaintiff’s injuries,” lest it
“reach and inhibit routine activities and, given the
ATA’s extraterritorial reach, … adversely affect the
United States’ relationships with foreign Nations.”
U.S. Amicus Br. 14-15, O’Neill v. Al Rajhi Bank, No.
13-318 (U.S. May 27, 2014), 2014 WL 2202862; see also
U.S. Amicus Br. 3-4, Weiss, Strauss, Nos. 21-381 & 21382 (U.S. May 24, 2022) (even criminal conduct barred
by the ATA’s material support provision may not support “‘civil tort liability under Section 2333(a)’” where
“‘the connection between a defendant’s actions and the
act of international terrorism that harms the victim is
insubstantial’”).
Accordingly, if the Court grants certiorari in Gonzalez, the Court also should grant review in this case
(or, at a minimum, hold this case pending this Court’s
disposition of Weiss and Strauss) to ensure consistency
and predictability under the ATA’s frequently litigated
aiding-and-abetting provision.
OPINIONS BELOW
The Ninth Circuit’s decision (App. 1a-150a) is reported at 2 F.4th 871. The district court’s order granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss (App. 151a-180a) is
reported at 343 F. Supp. 3d 904. The Ninth Circuit’s
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order denying panel rehearing and rehearing en banc
(App. 181a) is unreported.
JURISDICTION
The Ninth Circuit entered judgment on June 22,
2021. It denied Defendants’ timely petition for panel
rehearing and rehearing en banc on December 27, 2021.
On March 14, 2022, Justice Kagan granted Defendants’
application to extend the time within which to file a petition for a writ of certiorari, making the deadline May
26, 2022. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1254(1).
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
18 U.S.C. § 2333 provides:
(a) Action and jurisdiction.—Any national of the
United States injured in his or her person, property, or
business by reason of an act of international terrorism,
or his or her estate, survivors, or heirs, may sue therefor in any appropriate district court of the United
States and shall recover threefold the damages he or
she sustains and the cost of the suit, including attorney’s fees.
*

*

*

(d) Liability.—
(1) Definition.—In this subsection, the term “person” has the meaning given the term in section 1 of title
1.
(2) Liability.—In an action under subsection (a) for
an injury arising from an act of international terrorism
committed, planned, or authorized by an organization
that had been designated as a foreign terrorist organization under section 219 of the Immigration and Na-
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tionality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189), as of the date on which
such act of international terrorism was committed,
planned, or authorized, liability may be asserted as to
any person who aids and abets, by knowingly providing
substantial assistance, or who conspires with the person who committed such an act of international terrorism.
STATEMENT
A. Plaintiffs’ Allegations
In 2017, Abdulkadir Masharipov shot and killed 39
people at the Reina nightclub in Istanbul, Turkey
(“Reina attack”). C.A.E.R.74 ¶ 1, C.A.E.R.141 ¶¶ 374377. Among the victims of that attack was Nawras
Alassaf, a citizen of Jordan and a relative of Plaintiffs,
who identify themselves as American citizens.
C.A.E.R.80-81 ¶¶ 33-37.
Plaintiffs allege that
Masharipov committed the attack at the direction of
ISIS. See C.A.E.R.132-135 ¶¶ 325, 334, 337, 342-343,
C.A.E.R.140-141 ¶¶ 367-370.
Plaintiffs sued Twitter, Google, and Facebook—
operators of global Internet platforms that are used by
billions of people across the world to send and share
hundreds of millions of messages, Tweets, videos, and
other posts on myriad topics every day.
See
C.A.E.R.107-108 ¶¶ 189-196; C.A.E.R.111-112 ¶¶ 212219; C.A.E.R.115-116 ¶¶ 231-238. As relevant here,
Plaintiffs sought to hold Defendants liable under the
ATA for aiding and abetting. C.A.E.R.170-171.
The Amended Complaint does not allege that Defendants helped to commit the attack, or even had any
connection to the attack or to Masharipov. Plaintiffs do
not even allege that Masharipov ever had accounts on
Twitter, Facebook, or YouTube (which is owned by
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Google), or that he ever used the Defendants’ platforms
for any reason at all. The only online service Plaintiffs
connect to Masharipov is “the messaging app Telegram”—a service with no connection to any Defendant—which he allegedly used to communicate in planning the attack. See Yayla, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, The Reina Nightclub Attack and the
Islamic State Threat to Turkey, 10 CTC Sentinel 9
(Mar. 2017), https://ctc.usma.edu/the-reina-nightclubattack-and-the-islamic-state-threat-to-turkey/ (cited at
C.A.E.R.135 ¶ 347 n.44).
The Amended Complaint instead alleges that some
other ISIS adherents—who are not alleged to have
been involved in the Reina attack—were among the billions of people who used Defendants’ services. See
C.A.E.R.76 ¶ 12.
But the Amended Complaint
acknowledges that, in doing so, those alleged supporters of terrorism violated Defendants’ rules and evaded
Defendants’ enforcement of those rules. It concedes
that each Defendant has rules against posting content
that threatens or promotes terrorist activity or other
forms of violence (see, e.g., C.A.E.R.161 ¶ 473,
C.A.E.R.168 ¶ 485), and that Defendants regularly enforced those rules by removing content and shutting
down accounts (see, e.g., C.A.E.R.99-100 ¶ 146,
C.A.E.R.113 ¶ 223, C.A.E.R.160 ¶ 469).1 The Amended
Complaint concedes, for example, that Twitter repeatedly terminated the accounts of particular ISIS sup1

Defendants’ rules prohibit the use of their platforms for terrorist activities or content. See The Twitter Rules, https://support.
twitter.com/articles/18311 (visited May 26, 2022); YouTube Violent
or Graphic Content Policies, https://support.google.com/youtube/
answer/2802008?hl=en (visited May 26, 2022); Facebook Community
Standards, https://transparency.fb.com/policies/community-standards/
(visited May 26, 2022).
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porters who had accessed its platform, yet faults Twitter for allegedly being insufficiently swift in shutting
down accounts that those same supporters later established using different credentials. C.A.E.R.160-165
¶¶ 469, 474-478. And the Amended Complaint does not
identify any specific account or post that any Defendant
failed to block or remove after becoming aware that it
supported or had any connection to ISIS.
The Amended Complaint nonetheless seeks to impose aiding-and-abetting liability on Defendants for allegedly not taking sufficiently “meaningful action to
stop” ISIS by, for example, “proactively” detecting and
removing ISIS-related accounts or posts. C.A.E.R.108
¶ 197, C.A.E.R.159-160 ¶ 466; see also C.A.E.R.76 ¶ 12,
C.A.E.R.113 ¶¶ 222-223, C.A.E.R.160 ¶ 469. On that
basis, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants are civilly liable
for any and all injuries that can somehow be attributed
to or blamed on ISIS, including injuries arising from
the attack at the Reina nightclub. C.A.E.R 171 ¶ 506.
B. Proceedings Below
Plaintiffs sued Defendants in the Northern District
of California, seeking treble damages.
See
C.A.E.R.117.
Defendants moved to dismiss the
Amended Complaint for failure to allege essential elements of the claims and on the additional ground that
all of Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act. See Mot. to Dismiss,
Dist. Ct. Dkt. 62.2

2

Plaintiffs alleged more claims initially but appealed only the
district court’s dismissal of their aiding-and-abetting claim. App.
60a. Only the aiding-and-abetting claim is at issue in this petition.
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At a hearing on the motion to dismiss, the district
court noted that Plaintiffs do not assert any direct link
between the alleged general use of Defendants’ platforms by some ISIS sympathizers and either
Masharipov or the Reina attack. C.A.E.R.26. In response, Plaintiffs’ counsel confirmed the absence of any
allegations that Masharipov ever used any of Defendants’ platforms. C.A.E.R.28. Plaintiffs’ counsel argued
that Defendants should be held liable nonetheless because ISIS allegedly directed Masharipov to conduct
the attack and because ISIS allegedly had previously
benefited from its supporters’ general use of Defendants’ online platforms. See C.A.E.R.28-30.
The district court rejected that argument and dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice. The court noted at the outset that Plaintiffs’ entire theory raised
“concerns” because “Plaintiffs seem to take the position
that … ISIS’s ‘act of international terrorism’ encompasses all of ISIS’s terrorist operations, and not the
Reina attack specifically.” App. 173a. The court found
it “questionable that this is what Congress intended”
because that could “effectively transform” Section
2333(d) into a statute that “provides for liability for aiding/abetting or conspiring with a foreign terrorist organization generally,” contrary to the statutory text.
Id. The court explained, for example, that the statute
imposes liability for injuries arising from “‘an act of international terrorism’” and only where “the secondary
tortfeasor assisted the principal tortfeasor in committing ‘such an act of international terrorism.’” App.
173a-174a (emphasis added by the district court) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2333(d)(2)). The court emphasized that
Section 2333(d) “does not refer to assisting a foreign
terrorist organization generally or such an organization’s general course of conduct.” App. 174a.
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The district court further held that Plaintiffs’ allegations would fail even if ATA secondary liability could
attach to a defendant’s general assistance of a terrorist
organization. App. 175a. The court explained that, in
enacting JASTA, Congress instructed that the “‘proper
legal framework for how [aiding-and-abetting] liability
should function’” is the framework identified in Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1983). App.
175a; see 18 U.S.C. § 2333 Statutory Note (Findings and
Purpose § 5). Halberstam set forth three elements for
civil aiding-and-abetting liability: (1) “the party whom
the defendant aids must perform a wrongful act that
causes an injury”; (2) “the defendant must be generally
aware of his role as part of an overall illegal or tortious
activity at the time that he provides the assistance”;
and (3) “the defendant must knowingly and substantially assist the principal violation.” 705 F.2d at 487-488.
The district court held that Plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege the second and third elements. Addressing
the scienter requirement, the court held that there is
no plausible allegation that “Defendants were generally
aware … they were playing or assuming a ‘role’ … in
ISIS’s terrorist activities” or that “Defendants knew
that ISIS members had previously used Defendants’
platforms” to plan or carry out terrorist attacks. App.
176a-177a, 179a. The court also held that Plaintiffs
failed to adequately allege Defendants provided “substantial assistance,” even assuming that assisting ISIS
generally (as opposed to the Reina attack in particular)
could support aiding-and-abetting liability under the
ATA. App. 177a-179a. Having ruled that Plaintiffs
failed to state a plausible claim for relief under the
ATA, the district court declined to reach Defendants’
separate argument that Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by
Section 230.
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The Ninth Circuit reversed. App. 71a. The court
acknowledged that Defendants did not have any “intent
to further or aid ISIS’s terrorist activities” or share
“any of ISIS’s objectives”; that Defendants had, “at
most, an arms-length transactional relationship with
ISIS” and did not provide any specialized assistance,
tailored to terrorists; that Defendants’ “policies prohibit posting content that promotes terrorist activity”; and
that Defendants “regularly removed ISIS content and
ISIS-affiliated accounts.” App. 64a-65a. The court
nonetheless concluded that the Amended Complaint’s
allegations were sufficient to establish that Defendants
“knowingly” provided substantial assistance because
Defendants allegedly have “been aware of ISIS’s use of
their respective social media platforms for many years”
but allegedly have not “take[n] meaningful steps to
prevent that use.” App. 62a.
In addition, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that
“Plaintiffs unambiguously conceded the act of international terrorism they allege is the Reina Attack itself.”
App. 64a. But the court held that, under Halberstam,
the “principal violation” that a defendant must “knowingly and substantially assist[]” includes the broader
illicit enterprise and thus Plaintiffs need only allege
that Defendants assisted “ISIS’s terrorism campaign”
or “enterprise,” not the Reina attack. App. 52a-54a,
63a. Because the district court had not reached the
question of Section 230’s application, the Ninth Circuit
declined to consider that statute as an alternative basis
to affirm. App. 16a n.6.
In the same opinion, however, the Ninth Circuit also disposed of Gonzalez. As the court explained, “the
complaints in Gonzalez and Taamneh are similar,”
based on similar theories of liability. App. 60a; see App.
5a-12a. But the court disposed of Gonzalez and
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Taamneh differently because, whereas “the bulk of the
Gonzalez Plaintiffs’ claims were properly dismissed [below] on the basis of § 230 immunity,” “the district court
in Taamneh did not reach § 230” and “only addressed
whether the Taamneh Plaintiffs plausibly alleged” aiding-and-abetting liability under the ATA. App. 60a.
Thus, although the Ninth Circuit affirmed dismissal in
Gonzalez on the ground that Section 230 protected
Google from liability arising from content on its platform, the court “decline[d] to reach” Section 230 “in the
first instance” in Taamneh because the district court
had not. App. 16a n.6. The Gonzalez plaintiffs have petitioned for review of the Ninth Circuit’s Section 230
decision. See Pet., Gonzalez, No. 21-1333 (U.S. Apr. 4,
2022).
The court of appeals denied rehearing. App. 181a.
On remand, the parties stipulated to automatic dismissal of this action upon this Court’s denial of the plaintiffs’ certiorari petition in Gonzalez. See Stipulation
and Order 3, Dist. Ct. Dkt. 88. The parties stated that
Gonzalez involved a claim against Google for aidingand-abetting liability that is “materially identical” to
the claim in this case. Id. at 2. Accordingly, the parties
stipulated, “if the Supreme Court denies the petition
for a writ of certiorari in Gonzalez, or if the Supreme
Court grants the petition and affirms the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in regard to Section 230, then Plaintiffs’
claim for aiding and abetting under the ATA (their only
remaining claim) fails as a matter of law based on the
Ninth Circuit’s holding in Gonzalez.” Id. In those circumstances, the parties stipulated, this action “shall
immediately be dismissed with prejudice.” Id. at 3.
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REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
The Ninth Circuit misconstrued a critically important federal statute. In an unprecedented ruling, the
court of appeals held that a defendant may be secondarily liable under the ATA for “knowingly” assisting “an
act of international terrorism” even though the defendant’s services were not used in connection with the specific attack or by the individuals who committed or directed it, the defendant did not share any terroristic
purpose, and the defendant regularly enforced its rules
to prevent terrorists from using its services. That is not
“knowing” assistance, nor does it square with the statute’s repeated use of the phrase “an act of international
terrorism.” No other court of appeals has authorized
such a broad scope of ATA aiding-and-abetting liability.
And its erroneous statutory construction threatens
harmful consequences for ordinary businesses that provide generally available services or engage in armslength transactions with large numbers of consumers.
If the Court were to grant review in Gonzalez,
which it should not because the question presented in
that case is not certworthy, this case would be an appropriate vehicle for addressing the important ATA
questions presented here and thereby restoring uniformity in the interpretation of the ATA. At a minimum, if the Court grants review in Gonzalez, the Court
should hold this case until the Court disposes of the petitions now pending in Weiss and Strauss.
I.

THE DECISION BELOW IS WRONG AND CONFLICTS
WITH DECISIONS OF OTHER COURTS OF APPEALS

The Ninth Circuit’s decision is incorrect and contrary to decisions of other circuits, for two reasons.
First, Defendants did not “knowingly” assist ISIS
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simply because their undisputed efforts to detect and
prevent terrorists from using their widely available
services allegedly could have been more “meaningful”
or “aggressive.” App. 62a. Second, Defendants cannot
be liable for aiding and abetting under the ATA when
their provision of generic, widely available services had
no alleged connection to the specific “act of international terrorism” from which the suit arose. The Ninth Circuit is the only court of appeals that has construed the
ATA secondary-liability provision in both of these
ways. If the Court grants certiorari in Gonzalez, that
decision would also warrant this Court’s review, especially given the competing interpretation of the ATA
that the plaintiffs in Weiss and Strauss have asked this
Court to adopt, and the frequency with which civil ATA
suits are brought.
A. Allegations That Defendants Provided Widely
Available Services That Were Used By Terrorists—Despite Defendants’ Efforts To Prevent Such Use—Cannot Establish “Knowing”
Assistance
Section 2333(d) permits aiding-and-abetting liability only when a defendant “knowingly” provides substantial assistance to the principal wrong. Yet the
Ninth Circuit eliminated any meaningful knowledge
requirement, adopting a standard that is far less demanding than other circuits apply under the ATA and
that breaks sharply from traditional civil aiding-andabetting standards.
1. The Ninth Circuit held that Plaintiffs plausibly
alleged the requisite knowledge merely because their
complaint alleges that, according to third-party reports,
some ISIS supporters were among the billions of users
of Defendants’ platforms, and Defendants’ acknowl-
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edged efforts to prevent such use could have been more
“meaningful.” App. 62a; see App. 61a. The court held
that this alleged failure to do more could establish the
requisite “knowledge,” even though:
•

Defendants did not share ISIS’s goals or have any
“intent to further or aid ISIS’s terrorist activities,”
App. 65a;

•

Defendants had, “at most, an arms-length transactional relationship with ISIS” and did not provide
any specialized assistance, tailored to terrorists,
App. 64a;

•

Defendants’ “policies prohibit posting content that
promotes terrorist activity,” App. 64a-65a;

•

Defendants “regularly removed ISIS-affiliated accounts and content,” App. 65a; and

•

Plaintiffs do not identify any specific account or
post that any Defendant failed to block or remove
after becoming aware that it supported or was connected to ISIS.

In the Ninth Circuit, therefore, a business knowingly assists terrorism under the ATA so long as it is
generally aware that supporters of a terrorist group
are among the numerous (even billions of) people using
its widely accessible service and the business falls short
in trying “to prevent that use.” App. 62a (emphasis
added). In other words, in the Ninth Circuit, even
where a plaintiff’s claim is predicated solely on a defendant’s alleged failure to do more to exclude a terrorist group’s supporters from the many who use its generic services (rather than any affirmative decision to
do something that aids terrorists), Section 2333(d)’s
mental state requirement may be satisfied through
mere general awareness of such users.
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2. Courts outside the Ninth Circuit demand a far
greater showing to establish knowledge under the
ATA.
For example, in Weiss and Strauss (two cases currently on petitions for certiorari in this Court), the Second Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the
requisite knowledge could be shown through the defendants’ transfers of funds to charities that the defendants allegedly knew were controlled by or were alter egos of Hamas, because there was no indication that
the defendants knew the transfers would be used for
“any terroristic purpose.” Weiss, 993 F.3d at 166-167;
accord Strauss, 842 F. App’x at 704 (disposing of the
case “for the reasons discussed in Weiss”).3 The court
deemed the defendants’ knowing but general assistance
to organizations that allegedly had ties to Hamas to be
3

In seeking this Court’s review, the plaintiffs in Weiss and
Strauss cite Boim v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief & Development, 549 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2008), and United States v. ElMezain, 664 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2011), as conflicting with the Second
Circuit’s decisions. See Pet. 21-27, Weiss, No. 21-381 (U.S. Sept. 3,
2021); Pet. 15-17, Strauss, No. 21-382 (U.S. Sept. 3, 2021). Even if
that were so, those cases do not support what the Ninth Circuit
did in this case. In Boim, the Seventh Circuit required that the
defendant have knowingly contributed to the “nonviolent wing of
an organization that he knows to engage in terrorism.” 549 F.3d at
698 (emphasis added). El-Mezain is a criminal case that involved
the “material support” provision of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, which prohibits “knowingly” providing “material support or resources to a
foreign terrorist organization.” 664 F.3d at 536; see also infra p.23.
Neither case suggests that a social media platform knowingly assisted an act of international terrorism merely because terrorist
sympathizers used its services in violation of the platform’s rules
barring such use, particularly where, as here, the plaintiff alleged
that the platform prohibited terrorism content and regularly removed it, and did not allege that the platform failed to block any
specific account or post after becoming aware that it was tied to
the terrorist organization at issue.
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insufficient to satisfy knowledge. And in Honickman v.
BLOM Bank SAL, 6 F.4th 487 (2d Cir. 2021), the Second Circuit rejected an ATA aiding-and-abetting claim
because the plaintiffs’ allegations failed to show that
the defendant bank knew that its specific customers
were connected to Hamas “at the time that it provided
banking services” to those customers. Id. at 501.
Similarly, when courts outside the Ninth Circuit
have deemed the knowledge requirement satisfied,
they have relied on the defendant’s affirmative assistance to a specific individual or entity whom the defendant allegedly knew was a terrorist or the defendants’ alleged knowledge that the assistance would be
used for terrorist acts. For example, in Kaplan v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, 999 F.3d 842 (2d Cir. 2021), the
Second Circuit held the necessary scienter satisfied because (among other things) the defendant bank allegedly provided banking services “to Hizbollah affiliates”
that “permitted the laundering of money—nearly half a
million dollars or dollar equivalents per day—in violation of regulatory restrictions meant to hinder the ability of [foreign terrorist organizations] to carry out terrorist attacks.” Id. at 865. The plaintiffs also alleged—
regarding the defendant’s assistance—that the defendant “had long supported Hizbollah’s ‘anti-Israel program, goals and activities.’” Id. at 866. For example, a
United Nations report had flagged a customer of the
defendant’s as laundering money for Hizbollah, but the
defendant “responded to that report by asserting that
the report was Israeli propaganda.” Id. In Atchley v.
AstraZeneka UK Limited, 22 F.4th 204 (D.C. Cir.
2022), the D.C. Circuit held that the plaintiffs plausibly
alleged scienter for ATA aiding-and-abetting liability
because the defendants allegedly provided medical
goods (including free goods) and money to a particular
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entity that was publicly reported to have a “mission to
engage in terrorist acts” (albeit through an intermediary), and the defendants allegedly “were aware” that
the goods they provided “‘would be used … to support
terrorist attacks.’” Id. at 221, 223.4
Plaintiffs’ allegations would not suffice under those
decisions. Like in Weiss and Strauss, there is no indication here that any Defendant ever had knowledge
that any specific account or post on its platform was attributable to an ISIS adherent without promptly removing that account or post, much less knowledge that
any such account or post served “any terroristic purpose.” Weiss, 993 F.3d at 166-167. And, unlike in
Kaplan, Plaintiffs fail to allege that Defendants knew
about (and yet did not promptly block or remove) a particular account or specific post that was connected to
ISIS or that Defendants had “long supported” ISIS’s
agenda. Kaplan, 999 F.3d at 866. Nor, unlike in Atchley, do Plaintiffs allege that Defendants knew that general use of its platforms by ISIS adherents would
“‘support terrorist attacks.’” Atchley, 22 F.4th at 223.
To the contrary, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that
Plaintiffs do not allege that Defendants had “any intent
to further or aid ISIS’s terrorist activities” or “shared
any of ISIS’s objectives.” App. 65a. The Ninth Circuit’s decisions that Plaintiffs nonetheless plausibly alleged knowledge under Section 2333 conflicts with
those decisions.

4

Although Twitter disagrees with the D.C. Circuit’s holding
that a defendant need not have “specific intent” or be “‘one in spirit’” with terrorists to be liable for aiding and abetting, Atchley, 22
F.4th at 223-224, the D.C. Circuit still relied on more than Plaintiffs’ “failure to do more” theory that the Ninth Circuit deemed
sufficient.
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3. The Ninth Circuit’s holding that the statute’s
knowledge requirement may be satisfied even when a
defendant is accused only of being insufficiently aggressive in its efforts to exclude terrorist adherents
from the vast population of users of its generic service
also conflicts with traditional aiding-and-abetting principles. In enacting civil aiding-and-abetting liability
under the ATA, Congress instructed courts to apply
these traditional standards. In particular, Congress
stated that the “‘proper legal framework’” for assessing
ATA aiding-and-abetting liability is the one identified
in Halberstam. App. 47a; see 18 U.S.C. § 2333 Statutory Note (Findings and Purpose § 5). Halberstam established that framework based on cases evaluating liability for aiding and abetting violations of federal securities laws, including Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas,
522 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1975) and Monsen v. Consolidated
Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793 (3d Cir. 1978). See Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 477-478 & n.8.
As the Eighth Circuit explained in a securities case
after Halberstam was decided, the “knowledge element
is critical” for aiding-and-abetting liability. See Camp
v. Dema, 948 F.2d 455, 459 (8th Cir. 1991). Without it,
“aiding and abetting would be indistinguishable from
simply aiding” and “would cast too wide a net, bringing
under it parties involved in nothing more than routine
business transactions.” Id. Thus, the Eighth Circuit
held in that case that a defendant “whose actions are
routine and part of normal everyday business practices” is not liable as an aider and abettor absent “a higher
degree of knowledge,” including “knowledge of a
wrongful purpose.” Id.
Likewise, in Woodward—one of the cases on which
Halberstam relied—the Fifth Circuit held that “[i]f the
evidence shows no more than transactions constituting
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the daily grist of the mill, we would be loathe to find …
liability without clear proof of intent.” 522 F.2d at 97.
In Woods v. Barnett Bank of Fort Lauderdale, the
Eleventh Circuit agreed that “‘stronger evidence of
complicity would be required for the alleged aider and
abettor who conducts what appears to be a transaction
in the ordinary course of his business.’” 765 F.2d 1004,
1009-1010 (11th Cir. 1985) (quoting Woodward, 522 F.2d
at 96). And in Monsen—also cited in Halberstam—the
Third Circuit similarly held that “[w]here the secondary defendant’s conduct is nothing more than inaction,”
aiding-and-abetting liability may attach when a plaintiff
demonstrates “that the aider-abettor [c]onsciously intended to assist in the perpetration of a wrongful act.”
579 F.2d at 800.
The Ninth Circuit had no justification for departing
from that prevailing view. As noted, Halberstam relied
on this securities law precedent. And Halberstam itself
only confirms that the Ninth Circuit erred. There the
D.C. Circuit affirmed the defendant’s liability for aiding
and abetting a burglary and resulting murder committed by her live-in partner—a scenario that is, “to put it
mildly, dissimilar to the one at issue here,” App. 48a.
The defendant gave individualized assistance to her
partner after the fact in each of a long-running series of
burglaries, providing “invaluable” services in an “unusual way”—including documenting and liquidating the
contraband from each burglary, and serving for years
as the operation’s “banker, bookkeeper, recordkeeper,
and secretary.” 705 F.2d at 486-487. This “continuous
participation reflected her intent and desire to make
the [illegal] venture succeed.” Id. at 488. The Halberstam court nowhere suggested, as the Ninth Circuit
held here, that the requisite scienter could be inferred
from standardized “arms-length” services used by bil-
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lions of people, much less Defendants’ alleged general
awareness that their vast user bases included persons
posting terrorist content in violation of regularlyenforced policies prohibiting such use. App. 64a.
B. The Terrorist Attack That Injured The Plaintiff Is The “Act Of International Terrorism”
And “Principal Violation” That A Defendant
Must Assist, Not Some General Terrorist
Campaign
The Ninth Circuit was also incorrect to hold that
ATA aiding-and-abetting liability may rest on allegedly
providing generalized assistance to a terrorist organization, rather than to the actual “act of international
terrorism” that injured the plaintiff. As the court of
appeals noted, “Plaintiffs unambiguously conceded the
act of international terrorism they allege is the Reina
Attack itself.” App. 64a. Nonetheless, applying Halberstam’s legal framework, see 18 U.S.C. § 2333 Statutory Note (Findings and Purpose § 5), that a defendant
must substantially assist “the principal violation” to be
liable for aiding and abetting, 705 F.2d at 477-478, the
Ninth Circuit construed the “relevant ‘principal violation’” as “ISIS’s terrorism campaign” or “enterprise,”
rather than the Reina attack itself, App. 52a-54a, 63a.
Under this holding, a defendant may face liability and
treble damages for aiding and abetting a terrorist attack without having done anything connected to that
attack.
The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation contravenes the
ATA’s text and structure. Section 2333(a) provides a
cause of action for U.S. nationals injured “by reason of
an act of international terrorism.” 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a)
(emphasis added). Then, Section 2333(d) states that,
“[i]n an action under subsection (a) for an injury arising
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from an act of international terrorism committed,
planned, or authorized by [a designated foreign terrorist] organization … , liability may be asserted as to any
person who aids and abets, by knowingly providing
substantial assistance, or who conspires with the person who committed such an act of international terrorism.” Id. § 2333(d) (emphases added). By using the
singular, “an act,” throughout Section 2333, Congress
made clear that aiding-and-abetting liability attaches
only when the defendant assists a specific crime, not
merely an overall “campaign” or “enterprise.” As this
Court explained recently, “Congress’s decision to use
the indefinite article ‘a’” can provide “evidence that it
used the term” to mean “a discrete … thing.” NizChavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct. 1474, 1481 (2021); see also
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618,
638 (2007) (distinguishing between “[a] discrete act of
discrimination” and “a succession of harassing acts”
that would constitute “a hostile work environment”),
overturned due to legislative action (Jan. 29, 2009).
Moreover, as the district court noted, the statute
“does not refer to assisting a foreign terrorist organization generally or such an organization’s general course
of conduct.” App. 174a. And as the district court also
explained, the “material support” provision of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339B establishes criminal liability for “‘knowingly
provid[ing] material support or resources to a foreign
terrorist organization,’” and thus Congress “could easily have used language similar to that” in Section 2333 if
it intended to create aiding-and-abetting liability for
generalized aid. App. 173a. The fact that Congress did
not do so indicates that Congress “‘intentionally and
purposely’” declined to create liability for aiding and
abetting a terrorist organization generally. Russello v.
United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983).
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The black-letter definition of aiding and abetting
likewise requires a link between the defendant’s assistance and the particular wrong that injured the plaintiff. The Restatement of Torts, for example, provides
that to be secondarily liable, a secondary actor must
have substantially assisted the primary tortfeasor’s
“conduct.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876(b)
(1979); see also Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 477-478 (discussing the Restatement of Torts). If Congress had
meant to depart from “the established meaning of” aiding and abetting by severing the link between aiding
and abetting and the principal wrong, it would have
done so expressly. Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 69
(1995). The court of appeals’ decision implying that
Congress did sever this link in enacting JASTA conflicts with how other courts, and even the Ninth Circuit
itself, have read similar aiding-and-abetting provisions
in other statutes. See SEC v. Fehn, 97 F.3d 1276, 1288
(9th Cir. 1996) (Securities Exchange Act aiding and
abetting required “‘substantial assistance’ in the commission of the primary violation”); Camp, 948 F.2d at
462 (“[T]here must be a ‘substantial causal connection
between the culpable conduct of the alleged aider and
abettor and the harm to plaintiff.’”).
Consistent with these principles, courts of appeals
in all previous ATA cases involving social media platforms have focused on whether the defendants assisted
the specific attack that injured the plaintiff. In Crosby
v. Twitter, Inc., the Sixth Circuit examined whether
the defendants substantially assisted the person who
committed “the shooting” at the nightclub. 921 F.3d
617, 626-627 (6th Cir. 2019). In Retana v. Twitter, Inc.,
the Fifth Circuit emphasized that ATA aiding-andabetting liability “focuses on the relationship between
the act of international terrorism and the secondary ac-
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tor’s alleged supportive conduct.” 1 F.4th 378, 383 (5th
Cir. 2021) (quoting Linde v. Arab Bank PLC, 882 F.3d
314, 331 (2d Cir. 2018)) (emphasis omitted). The Ninth
Circuit’s decision requiring only that the defendant assisted a general terrorist enterprise, even while acknowledging that the “act of international terrorism” is
the specific attack at issue, cannot be logically reconciled with those decisions.5
In Halberstam, the D.C. Circuit held the defendant
liable for the murder at issue based on her substantial
assistance to her domestic partner’s burglary “enterprise.” 705 F.2d at 488; see App. 53a-54a. And recently,
the Second and D.C. Circuits relied on Halberstam to
conclude incorrectly (as did the Ninth Circuit below)
that a plaintiff need allege only that the defendant assisted some illegal “enterprise”, Atchley, 22 F.4th at
222, not the specific “injury-causing act,” Honickman, 6
F.4th at 499. But Halberstam’s conclusion was based
on the fact that the defendant was a full and willing
participant in, and logically and practically aided, each
of her live-in partner’s burglaries that made up the socalled “enterprise.” 705 F.3d at 488. Here, the Amended Complaint is fatally deficient because it alleges no
connection whatsoever between Defendants’ alleged
assistance and the Reina attack.
These factual distinctions are especially important
in light of JASTA’s preamble, which notes only that
Halberstam “provides the proper legal framework,”
5

The Second and Eleventh Circuits have also affirmed dismissal of ATA aiding-and-abetting claims against operators of social media platforms. See Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 71
(2d Cir. 2019) (affirming dismissal on Section 230 grounds), cert.
denied, 140 S. Ct. 761 (2020); Colon v. Twitter, Inc., 14 F.4th 1213,
1228 (11th Cir. 2021) (affirming dismissal for failure to plausibly
allege the elements of an ATA aiding-and-abetting claim).
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Pub. L. No. 114-222, § 2, 130 Stat. 852; Congress did not
elevate Halberstam’s unusual facts above JASTA’s
text. And in its “Legal Framework” section, Halberstam explains that aiding-and-abetting liability requires that “the defendant … knowingly and substantially assist the principal violation.” 705 F.2d at 476478 (emphasis added). Thus, the “principal violation”
that a defendant must substantially assist under Halberstam is the “act of international terrorism” from
which the plaintiff’s injury arose.
18 U.S.C.
§ 2333(d)(2).
II. TOGETHER, THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S TWO HOLDINGS
ELIMINATE ANY MEANINGFUL LIMITATION ON ATA
AIDING-AND-ABETTING LIABILITY
Either of the Ninth Circuit’s holdings would warrant this Court’s review, but combined they make the
Court’s clarification of the ATA’s secondary liability
provision even more necessary. The two holdings paint
a bleak picture. The Ninth Circuit would impose ATA
aiding-and-abetting liability on defendants who were
generally aware that their vast user base included adherents of a terrorist organization even where the defendants admittedly: (1) lacked “any intent to further or
aid [the organization’s] terrorist activities” or “objectives”; (2) affirmatively (if imperfectly) worked to avoid
assisting the organization by “regularly” enforcing
rules barring usage by terrorists; and (3) had no role
whatsoever in planning or assisting the attack that injured the plaintiffs. App. 65a. That expansive scope of
liability threatens significant harm to countless entities.
Although the Second and D.C. Circuits have recently held—in the absence of this Court’s guidance—
that a defendant need not assist the specific attack that
injures the plaintiff, even those circuits have relied on
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more than Plaintiffs’ lack-of-sufficient policing theory
to satisfy the statutory knowledge requirement, such
as awareness that the defendant’s assistance would be
for a “terroristic purpose,” Weiss, 993 F.3d at 166-167,
or “‘used … to support terrorist attacks,’” Atchley, 22
F.4th at 223. By contrast, the Ninth Circuit held it sufficient to plead general knowledge that terrorist supporters were somewhere among the Defendants’ billions of customers, even without a connection between
the assistance and the terrorist act. That approach—
allowing liability based on only alleged generalized
knowledge and alleged generalized aid—creates precisely the sort of “seemingly boundless litigation risks”
that earlier “troubled” another panel of the Ninth Circuit about expansively interpreting ATA’s direct liability provision prior to JASTA. Fields v. Twitter, Inc.,
881 F.3d 739, 749 (9th Cir. 2018). As that court recognized, the “highly interconnected” nature of social media, the internet, and “modern economic and social life”
might mean that certain uses of Defendants’ websites
cause distant “ripples of harm,” but “[n]othing in § 2333
indicates that Congress intended to provide a remedy
to every person reached by these ripples.” Id.; accord
Crosby, 921 F.3d at 625. The Ninth Circuit’s ruling below threatens particularly broad liability because primary liability is expressly limited by the requirement
that the defendant’s acts proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury, Fields, 881 F.3d at 744-745, whereas secondary liability (according to the Ninth Circuit) can attach to any terrorist attack, anywhere in the world,
without any meaningful showing of knowledge or any
connection between the defendant’s conduct and the
attack.
The implications of the decision below reach beyond online services. Weiss and Strauss involve bank
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defendants, see Weiss, 993 F.3d at 151; Strauss, 842 F.
App’x at 703-704, and Atchley involves pharmaceutical
companies. 22 F.4th at 209. Absent this Court’s review, the uncertainty created by the Ninth Circuit’s
expansive construction could give purchase to creative
theories of liability against ordinary businesses providing standardized goods or services to the general public. That is particularly worrisome because, as the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce explained below, “even wellmeaning and responsible defendants facing AntiTerrorism Act claims will have difficulty staving off
costly and invasive discovery, a result that ‘will push
cost-conscious defendants to settle even anemic cases.’”
U.S. Chamber of Commerce Amicus Br. 13-14, Ct. App.
Dkt. 74. Similarly, for many businesses, the mere pendency of such actions “inflicts significant harm … by
branding them as ‘supporters of terrorism’ that are
complicit in horrific terrorist attacks.” Id. at 14.
Had Congress intended to expose businesses to
treble damages merely for falling short in their efforts
to prevent misuse of their generic, widely available
services, it would have said so clearly. It did not. The
Court should grant review to clarify that Congress
meant what it said when it permitted aiding-andabetting liability only where a defendant “knowingly”
assisted “an act of international terrorism.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 2333(d)(2) (emphases added).
*

*

*

As noted above, if this Court denies the petition for
certiorari pending in Gonzalez—as it should—that denial will fully resolve this case pursuant to the parties’
stipulation. But if this Court grants review in Gonzalez, this petition should also be granted because, left
undisturbed, the decision below would both create con-
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flicts among the circuits and impose the significant
harms described above.
III. IF THE COURT GRANTS CERTIORARI IN WEISS OR
STRAUSS, THE COURT SHOULD AT LEAST HOLD THIS
CASE AND APPROPRIATELY DISPOSE OF IT IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH ANY MERITS DECISION IN
WEISS OR STRAUSS
The pending petitions in Weiss and Strauss present
a question closely related to one presented here regarding the ATA’s knowledge requirement for aiding-andabetting liability. The plaintiffs there argued that a
bank could be held liable under Section 2333 for aiding
and abetting terrorist attacks committed by Hamas because they transferred funds to charities allegedly
knowing the charities had ties to Hamas. See, e.g.,
Weiss, 993 F.3d at 151-152; Strauss, 842 F. App’x at
704. The Second Circuit held those claims not viable,
however, because there was no indication that the defendants knew that “the transfers were for any terroristic purpose” or that the charities with alleged ties to
Hamas “funded terrorist attacks or recruited persons
to carry out such attacks.” Weiss, 993 F.3d at 166. The
court concluded, therefore, that the plaintiffs could not
show that the defendants were “knowingly providing
substantial assistance to Hamas” or that they were
“generally aware” they were “playing a role in Hamas’s
acts of terrorism.” Id. at 167.
Objecting to that interpretation of the scienter requirement, the plaintiffs in Weiss and Strauss have
asked this Court to decide “[w]hether a person who
knowingly transfers substantial funds to a designated”
foreign terrorist organization “aids and abets that organization’s terrorist acts” under Section 2333(d)(2).
Pet. i, Weiss, No. 21-381 (U.S. Sept. 3, 2021); accord
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Pet. i, Strauss, No. 21-382 (U.S. Sept. 3, 2021). This
Court called for the views of the Solicitor General, and
on May 24, 2022, the Solicitor General recommended
denial of the petitions. See U.S. Amicus Br., Nos. 21381 & 21-382 (U.S. May 24, 2022).6
If this Court decides to grant certiorari in Weiss or
Strauss (while the petition in Gonzalez remains pending), the Court should hold this case given the similarity of the issues presented. As the Ninth Circuit
acknowledged, Plaintiffs do not allege that Defendants
had “any intent to further or aid ISIS’s terrorist activities” or “shared any of ISIS’s objectives,” and to the
contrary concede that Defendants regularly enforced
rules against terrorist content. App. 65a. There is no
allegation, in other words, that Defendants knew that
any specific ISIS-related account or post that remained
on their platforms was for “any terroristic purpose.”
Weiss, 993 F.3d at 166. A merits decision by this Court
in Weiss or Strauss is thus likely to substantially affect
disposition of Plaintiffs’ claim in this case. Accordingly,
the Court should, at a minimum, hold this case if it
grants certiorari in Weiss or Strauss, and appropriately
dispose of this case in a manner consistent with any
merits decision in Weiss or Strauss.

6

The United States stated in a footnote that the Ninth Circuit’s analysis of the ATA in Gonzalez does not conflict with the
Second Circuit’s ATA decisions because the Ninth Circuit favorably discussed other Second Circuit decisions. U.S. Amicus Br. 23
n.3, Nos. 21-381 & 21-382 (U.S. May 24, 2022). The Ninth Circuit
did not, however, discuss the recent Weiss or Strauss decisions
and it is the scienter analysis in those decisions that conflicts with
the Ninth Circuit’s scienter analysis in this case.
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CONCLUSION
The Court should resolve this petition for certiorari
as follows:
1. If certiorari is denied in Gonzalez, deny this petition as well, because this case will have ceased to be a
vehicle for the Court’s review of the questions presented in this petition.
2. If certiorari is granted in Gonzalez, grant this
petition as well.
3. Alternatively, hold this petition until the Court
disposes of Weiss or Strauss and then dispose of this
case as appropriate, conditional on the petition in Gonzalez remaining outstanding.
Respectfully submitted.
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